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RECENT DECISIONS
to the original plaintiff's defendant and thus can only affect those
claims joined by the original plaintiff. The right of removal is a
purely statutory right and in light of the avowed congressional
purpose to limit removal, the statute must be strictly construed.40
The Court in the principal case is the first federal district
court in New York to consider the interpretation of the phrase
"joined by" in section 1441. This holding is indeed significant
in that it is the only New York district court to expressly deny
the right of removal by a third-party defendant based on a
strict construction of section 1441(c). Such a treatment of
"ancillary" third-party claims is consistent with the present federal
trend.4
It is interesting to note that the liability of the third-party
defendant was contingent upon the original defendant's liability
to fhe plaintiff. Both causes of action arose from the identical
transaction, and, under the rule of the Finn case, such circum-
stances do not result in "separate and independent" actions. Since
the Court in the principal case could have conveniently denied re-
moval on this basis, it could be said that the Court desired to
determine the applicability of section 1441 to third-party practice.
Such a broad holding now makes a determination of what con-
stitutes "separate and independent" unnecessary since removal is
precluded ab initio.
JUDGMENTS - REs JuDIcATA HELD INOPERATIVE IN INTER-
STATE LAND CONTROVERSY. - A change in the flow of the Missouri
River - the borderline between Missouri and Nebraska - caused
the jurisdictional location of certain river bottom land to become
40 Ibid.
41 Approximately one month after the principal case was decided, a New
Jersey district court in White v. Baftic Conveyor Co., 209 F. Supp. 716
(D.N.J. 1962) rendered a decision denying the third-party defendant's right
to remove. The basic reasoning employed by the court in Baltic is
substantially that used in the principal case, but the court in Baltic offers
additional arguments by suggesting that if the ancillary suit were removed
and the transactions were interrelated, one court might have to await the
outcome of the other's trial and this would defeat "the prompt; economical,
and sound administration of justice." Id. at 721. A second argument
offered is that if one court controls a main claim and a third-party claim,
it will be considerably easier to promote settlement possibilities. Ibid.
The court here expressly refused to follow the decision in Industrial
Lithographic Co. v. Mendelsohn, 119 F.. Supp. 284 (D.N.J. 1954), which
was rendered by a federal court of the same jurisdiction and whose holding
was contra.
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doubtful. Plaintiff, a Missouri citizen, claimed title to the land,
as did defendants, Nebraska citizens. Defendants instituted an
action to quiet title to the land against the present plaintiff in a
Nebraska state court. In that action, the present plaintiff con-
tested the Nebraska court's jurisdiction alleging that the land was
located in Missouri. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Nebraska
held that the land was located in Nebraska and consequently the
lower court had jurisdiction.1 Plaintiff then instituted the present
action to quiet title in a Missouri state court. Upon removal
to the federal district court, the defendants set forth the Nebraska
judgment as an affirmative defense. The district court rendered
judgment for the defendant holding the prior judgment to be
res judicata both as to the jurisdictional issue and the ownership
of the land, despite its own finding that the land was situated in
Missouri. The court of appeals reversed and remanded holding,
that in a land controversy such as,this, the policy against permitting
a court to act beyond its jurisdiction outweighs any conflicting
res judicata principle. Hence, res judicata could not preclude
the district court from inquiring collaterally into the subject-
matter jurisdiction of the Nebraska court. Duke v. Durfee, 308
F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1962), petition for cert. filed, 31 U.S.L. WEEK
3172 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1962) (No. 593).
The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution requires
that the courts of each state accord to a judgment of another
state the force and effect which it has in the state where rendered,
provided that the original forum had jurisdiction over both the
parties and the subject matter.2 Federal courts are bound equally
with the state courts to observe the mandate of the full faith
and credit clause.3 However, it has long been a fundamental
principle in conflict of laws, that the constitutional command of
full faith and credit, while foreclosing inquiry into non-jurisdictional
matters, does not preclude a second forum's collateral inquiry into
questions of the first court's personal or subject-matter jurisdiction.4
On the other hand, the doctrine of res judicata as applied
to jurisdictional issues presents a problem decidedly more complex
1 Durfee v. Keiffer, 168 Neb. 272, 95 N.W.2d 618 (1959). The
present plaintiff claims title under a Missouri swamp land patent; the
defendants under a Nebraska sheriff's deed.
2 U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1; see Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S.
343 (1942).3 Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932). The full
faith and credit clause was implemented by Congress specifically to embrace
federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1958).4 E.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961);
Riley v. New York Trust Co., supra note 2; Bigelow v. Old Dominion
Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912); Thompson v. Whitman,
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1874).
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than the corresponding problem raised by the full faith and credit
clause. Res judicata precludes parties who have once contested
an issue before a competent tribunal from thereafter relitigating
the identical issue by means of a collateral attack in another forum. 5
Some jurisdictions have applied the doctrine not only to issues
which were actually litigated, but also to those questions which
could have been litigated.6
The application of the doctrine of res judicata to questions
of personal jurisdiction appears to be well established. Thus,
as the Supreme Court expressly enunciated in Baldwin v. Iowa
State Traveling Men's Ass'n, where an individual voluntarily
appears in an action and litigates the question of jurisdiction over
his person, the issue becomes res judicata and cannot be
collaterally attacked in any tribunal.8
The corresponding application of res judicata to questions of
subject-matter jurisdiction, as distinguished from jurisdiction over
the person, has been neither clear nor consistent. The early de-
cisions of the Supreme Court, which were primarily concerned
with the disposition of realty, held that the factor of subject-
matter jurisdiction could be collaterally inquired into at any time
and by any court.9 These cases appear to make no distinction
between situations in which the jurisdictional issue had been
expressly contested, and those in which it had not. Later, how-
ever, Forsyth v. Hammond,'0 another case involving jurisdiction
over realty, precluded such a collateral inquiry and represents a
departure from earlier opinions. However, in cases not involving
the Forsyth exception, the earlier rule persisted well into the
GSouthern Pac. R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48 (1897); see
LACK, JUDGMENTS § 504 (2d ed. 1902).6 E.g., Lipscomb v. Lipscomb, 179 Misc. 1025, 40 N.Y.S2d 720 (Sup.
Ct. 1943); Boyich v. J. A. Utley Co., 306 Mich. 625, 11 N.W.2d 267
(1943).
7283 U.S. 522 (1931).
SBaldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn, 283 U.S. 522 (1931);
see RESTATsmExT, CoNIFICr oF LAws § 451 (1) (Supp. 1948); RESTATEMENT,
JTDGMENTS §9 (1942). However, collateral inquiry may be made as to the
first tribunal's jurisdiction of the person of the defendant where the judgment
in the prior suit was obtained by default and without litigation of the
issue of personal jurisdiction. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's
Ass'n, supra.
9E.g., Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498 (1839); Elliott v.
Peirsol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328 (1828). See the discussion in Voorhees v.
Jackson, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 449, 477-78 (1836); Thompson v. Tolmie, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 157, 168-69 (1829).
10 166 U.S. 506 (1897). This case was concerned with an intra-state
realty conflict and the construction of a state's constitution and statutes by
the courts of that state.
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twentieth century and collateral attack of subject-matter jurisdiction
was permitted even in non-realty situations.i
In 1938 a contrary doctrine emerged. The Supreme Court
in Stoll v. Gottlieb12 (a bankruptcy controversy), applied the
Baldwin rule to issues concerning jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Thus:
[A) former judgment in a state court is conclusive between the parties and
their privies in a federal court when entered upon an actually contested issue
as to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the litigation.
1
The court placed specific reliance on the Forsyth case and dis-
tinguished the seemingly contrary results of intervening cases.14
Two years later in Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter
State Bank 15 (a readjustment of indebtedness proceeding involving
the effect of an unconstitutional statute), the application of res
judicata to jurisdiction over the subject matter was extended
to also include those controversies in which the issue of subject-
matter jurisdiction had neither been contested nor expressly de-
termined by the original forum. The Chicot case made every
judgment wherein the defendant received proper notice and failed
to contest the jurisdiction, conclusive upon the question of the
tribunal's jurisdiction of the subject matter. The burden was thus
placed upon the parties to raise the jurisdictional issue in the
original action or to be precluded from ever contesting the juris-
diction of the court.
The Chicot rule was approved in subsequent decisions,' 6 but
exceptions to this rule have appeared. Hence, where a counter-
vailing public policy outweighs the policy considerations underlying
the doctrine of res judicata, the Supreme Court has held that
the latter doctrine will not preclude a collateral inquiry into the
11 Grubb v. Public Util. Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470 (1930); Vallely v.
Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920).12305 U.S. 165 (1938). In Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938)
(divorce action), which preceded the Stoll case, the Court applied resjudicata to preclude a collateral attack of subject-matter jurisdiction where
the issue had previously been litigated, but its holding appeared to be limited
to divorce actions. In 1939 Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66(1939) (involving personalty) reaffirmed the Stoll doctrine: "One trial of
an issue is enough. 'The principles of res judicata apply to questions
of jurisdiction as well as to other issues,' as well to jurisdiction of the
subject matter as of the parties.' Id. at 78.
13 Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 173 (1938).
14 Id. at 173-76.
15 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
16 Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726 (1946) ; Jackson v. Irving Trust Co.,
311 U.S. 494 (1941); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S.
381 (1940) (dictum).
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prior court's subject-matter jurisdiction.' 7 The American Law
Institute has expressed its view of the area in the following
terms:
Where a court has jurisdiction over the parties and determines that it
has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties cannot collaterally
attack the judgment on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction
over the subject matter, unless the policy underlying the doctrine of
res judicata is outweighed by the policy against permitting the court to
act beyond its jurisdiction.' 8
This pronouncement of the Institute is based upon a comprehensive
review of the pertinent Supreme Court decisions, some of which
are specifically referred to in its Restatement.9
The view presented immediately above was accepted by the
Court in the principal case as a "correct statement of the law
as the Supreme Court has developed it." 20  This statement was
made only after the Court had made its own examination of the
relevant decisions relating to res judicata and subject-matter
jurisdiction. The Court noted that realty was directly in issue
in the present controversy and proceeded to examine the Supreme
Court decisions with this fact in mind. The earlier realty de-
cisions, excepting Forsyth which the Court distinguished and
limited to its peculiar facts,21 refused to apply res judicata to
questions of subject-matter jurisdiction. Even though the later
cases did so apply the doctrine, they were not concerned with
real estate, and in a few instances these cases indicated that
they were not intended to control realty situations. 22 In addition,
the Court found many expressions in Supreme Court decisions
17United States v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940);
Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940). The policy factor was also
dominant in Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348(1920).
18RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §451(2) (Supp. 1948); RESTATE-
MENT, JUDGMENTS § 10 (1942). The respective Restatement sections present
the following factors as appropriate in considering whether or not a
collateral attack should be permitted:
(a) the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter was clear;
(b) the determination as to jurisdiction depended upon a question of law
rather than of fact;(c) the court was one of limited and not of general jurisdiction;(d) the question of jurisdiction was not actually litigated;(e) the policy against the court's acting beyond its jurisdiction is strong.
Apparently the Institute had formerly found the area of res judicata and
subject-matter jurisdiction too uncertain to make a definitive statement. See
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 451, caveat (1934).
19 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 451, comment a (Supp. 1948).
2 ODuke v. Durfee, 308 F.2d 209, 218 (8th Cir. 1962), petition for cert.
filed, 31 U.S.L. WEEK, 3172 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1962) (No. 593).
21 Id. at 220.
22 Id. at 219.
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suggesting the existence of an immunity policy against the direct
disposition of one state's realty by a sister state's judgment.2 3
Factually perhaps, there was a significant enough basis for the
Court to regard the earlier decisions as controlling in the present
suit. Nevertheless, the Court elected to examine thoroughly the
more recent developments in the area and as a result accepted
the American Law Institute's view as its own.2 4
Perhaps the Court's express adoption of the Institute's view
will bring some clarity into a relatively uncertain area. As can
be readily seen this view affords a basis for the explanation of
the seemingly contradictory opinions relating to res judicata and
subject-matter jurisdiction. The determination pursuant to this
view, that a collateral attack is warranted, appears to be a sound
one-in an interstate land controversy such as was presented in
the principal case "the policy against the court's acting beyond its
jurisdiction is strong" 25 enough to outweigh any opposing res
judicata policy. The principal decision, however, tends to support
the factor of instability in the law. It presents one more instance
in which the conclusiveness of a prior judgment is undermined
in a second forum despite the observance of all the elements of
due process in the prior adjudication.
The Court in the instant case failed to note any relationship
between the doctrine of res judicata and full faith and credit,
although this relation appears to have a significant bearing on the
validity of the Court's decision. The precise relation between
the two has not been fully established by the Supreme Court
and consequently various interpretations have been presented.26
It is submitted that the res judicata doctrine as developed in the
rendering forum should be afforded the same treatment under
the full faith and credit clause as any other law of that forum
is afforded, provided the defendant appeared in the action. Such
a treatment would preserve the essential nature of both doctrines.
23 Id. at 219-20. Among the cases cited in the principal case to uphold
this proposition are: Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 294 (1942);
Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909); Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87
(1891).
24 The Court apparently gave much significance to policy factor (e) as
expressed in the Restatements. See note 16 supra. Factor (e) is the
only one of the five enumerated in the respective Restatements which the
Court found to be applicable in the instant case.
25 ESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 451(2) (e) (Supp. 1948); RE-
STATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 10(2) (e) (1942).
26 See generally Boskey & Braucher, Jurisdiction And Collateral Attack;
October Term, 1939, 40 COLum. L. Rv. 1006 (1940); Rashid, The Full
Faith And Credit Clause: Collateral Attack Of Jurisdictional Issues, 36
GEO. L.J. 154 (1948); Note, Developments In The Law-Res Judicata,
65 HARV. L. REv. 818, 820-21, 850-55 (1952).
[ VOL. 37
RECENT DECISIONS
Whereas full faith and credit is not applicable to questions of
jurisdiction, the doctrine of res judicata is. Hence, if a judgment
is rendered in one state where the application of the res judicata
principle precludes the parties from subsequently raising the question
of jurisdiction collaterally within that forum, then a court in
another state should be bound by full faith and credit to give
the prior judgment the same conclusiveness it enjoys in the
rendering state. Thus, the second forum will be bound to hold
the matter of jurisdiction, whether it be over the person or the
subject matter, as res judicata between parties to the previous
suit. Of course the application of the res judicata doctrine will
vary accordingly as that doctrine was evolved in the first forum,
but in all cases the rule of the first forum, if it is to receive
full faith and credit, must afford the contesting party due process.
27
It must also be noted that under extreme circumstances policy
considerations of the second forum have been allowed to defeat
the operation of full faith and credit.28  Consequently, it appears
that in an exceptional case a court in another state may permit
a collateral attack though the courts of the rendering state would
not.
With the above in mind, it will be noted that the Court in
the principal case makes no mention of the status of the Nebraska
law as to res judicata and collateral attack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Hence, the result arrived at in the instant case would
appear to be justified provided that the Nebraska judgment was
subject to collateral attack in that state; and unjustified if the
law of Nebraska is otherwise, unless the present case is deemed
one of those extremely rare cases in which the dictate of full faith
and credit is inoperative. In addition, if there were no controlling
decision in Nebraska, it seems that the Court in the principal
case was by that fact justified in applying its own rule as to
collateral attack of subject-matter jurisdiction 2 9
)X
MALPacTIcE - STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - PLAINTIFF'S
CAUSE OF ACTION HELD NOT To HAVE ACCRUED UNTIL END OF
CONTINUOUS TREATmENT. - Plaintiff, an infant, brought a mal-
27 American Sur. Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932).
28 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154 (1945);
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
29 Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939); Boskey &
Braucher, supra note 26, at 1011-12.
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